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‘Must’ implies ‘can’  




An open question in the semantics of modality is what relations there are among 
different modal flavours. In this article, we consider the thorny issue of whether 
ascribing to an agent the obligation to φ implies that it is possible for the agent to φ. 
Traditionally, this issue has been interpreted as whether ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. But 
another linguistic interpretation is available as well, namely, whether ‘must’ implies 
‘can’ (MIC). We show that ‘must’ does imply ‘can’ via a convergent argument. The 
first strand of the argument is theoretical: it consists in proving MIC from a well-
established theory of modality in natural language, i.e., that proposed by Kratzer. The 
second strand is empirical: we present novel acceptability judgment studies showing 
that MIC predicts and explains the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers. 
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“I have no idea if ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. … I have 
no idea why anyone would want to know if ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’. … We may as well ask another 
question.” 
—Philosopher AI, based on GPT-3 neural network 
(27 August 2020) 
 
1. Introduction 
Those who doubt that there is ever progress in philosophy should pause to think of what has 
happened in the domain of modality over the last six decades. Starting from Kripke’s (1963) 
models for modal languages, philosophical ideas about modality have generated a whole host 
of results in logic, computer science, and linguistics (Blackburn, van Benthem, & Wolter, 
2007). For the latter discipline, mainly due to the work of Kratzer (2012), we now have a theory 
that explains how one and the same modal expression can have different flavours in different 
contexts—for example, how ‘must’ can express different types of necessity in (A)-(C): 
 
(A)  Epistemic:  
[Context: We are looking for Sandro, but he is not at the gym.] He must be at the park.  
(B)  Deontic:  
[Context: Sandro didn’t pay his taxes.] He must go to jail. 
(C)  Teleological: 
[Context: Sandro wants to win the marathon.] He must train harder.  
  
In spite of this progress, there are aspects of modality that still need to be properly 





different modal flavours. This domain of inquiry we call multimodal semantics. How can one 
uncover such relations? Surprisingly enough, ethics can be a source of inspiration. Many 
philosophers have argued that if an individual has an obligation to do something, then it must 
be possible for her to do it (Kant, 1793/1998; see also: Haji, 2002; Vranas, 2007; Zimmerman, 
1996). Traditionally, this idea has been interpreted in terms of ‘ought’ implying ‘can’ (Moore, 
1922). After many years of debate, it remains unclear whether ‘ought’ does imply ‘can’ (Leben, 
2018; Kurthy, Lawford-Smith, & Sousa, 2017; Streumer, 2019) or does not (Henne et al., 2016; 
Buckwalter & Turri, 2015; King, 2019).  
In this article, we take a fresh perspective on the issue and discuss another linguistic 
reading of the idea that obligation implies possibility—a reading which has been almost 
entirely neglected in the literature so far. What we want to know is whether ‘must’ implies 
‘can’. And we claim that it does. On the other hand, we remain agnostic as to whether ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’.  
One might be surprised by our position. After all, aren’t ‘must’ and ‘ought’ synonyms 
when interpreted as expressing obligation? They aren’t. Consider this sentence (after von Fintel 
& Iatridou, 2008): 
  
(1) After using the bathroom, customers ought to wash their hands; employees must.  
 
If ‘must’ had the same meaning as ‘ought’, (1) should express the same proposition as (2): 
  






But it doesn’t. The reason is that ‘must’ expresses strong obligation, while ‘ought’ weak 
obligation (McNamara, 1996; von Fintel & Iatridou, 2008). The present article defends the 
claim that strong obligation implies possibility, while remaining silent as to whether weak 
obligation does.  
 
2. What does it mean that ‘must’ implies ‘can’? 
The claim that ‘must’ implies ‘can’ is open to many interpretations. Here is how we read it: 
 
MIC: For any context c that assigns deontic flavour to ‘must’ and circumstantial flavour 
to ‘can’, the proposition expressed by a sentence ‘S must φ’ in c entails the 
proposition expressed by the corresponding sentence ‘S can φ’ in c. 
 
2.1 Deontic ‘must’ and circumstantial ‘can’ 
MIC needs a fair bit of unpacking. To begin with, why is it formulated in terms of a 
quantification over contexts? The first reason is that words like ‘must’ and ‘can’ are massively 
polysemous: depending on the context, they can have different flavours (Leech, 2004; Palmer, 
1990). The principle we are after says that (strong) obligation implies possibility; this is why 
MIC specifies that the context assigns deontic flavour to ‘must’.  
With ‘can’, things are slightly more complicated. It may be natural to assume that when 
philosophers say that obligation implies possibility, they have in mind that obligation implies 
ability. For the most part, this assumption would be mistaken (Graham, 2011; Vranas, 2007). 
Consider this case. Sandro, a virtuoso violinist, has promised that he will play the violin tonight 
at a charity concert. Right before the concert, his arch-enemy Elio ties him to a chair, making 
it impossible for him to keep his promise. We have the intuition that Sandro is no longer under 





tied-up virtuoso is still a virtuoso). What ‘impossible’ here means is rather that the 
circumstances prevent Sandro from manifesting his ability. Accordingly, we take the ‘can’ in 
‘must implies can’ to express ability plus favourable circumstances, i.e., circumstances that 
don’t prevent the manifestation of the relevant ability. We follow linguists (Kratzer, 1991) in 
calling this type of possibility ‘circumstantial’. 
Hereafter, when we discuss sentences such as ‘Elio must help the children’ and ‘Sandro 
can print the flyer’, we assume that they are uttered in contexts in which ‘must’ is interpreted 
deontically and ‘can’ circumstantially. 
 
2.2 Time 
The second reason why MIC invokes contexts is that contexts also fix the time of the modals. 
Let us explain. Obligation and circumstantial possibility are time-dependent. Sandro now has 
the obligation to pick up Beth at the airport, since he has just promised to do it, but he did not 
have this obligation five minutes ago. Possibilities also come and go. It was possible for Mary 
to participate in next week’s marathon, but it is no longer possible for her to do that now since 
she has broken her legs. 
When philosophers say that obligation implies possibility, they mean the following: if 
someone has the obligation at a certain time to do something, then they have the possibility at 
that same time to do it. MIC captures this because ‘must’ and ‘can’ are present tense modals 
and, when interpreted in a context c, the time of such modals is always the time of c (Abusch, 
1997). For example, when uttered right after the release of the “smoking gun” tape, (3) said 
that Nixon had the obligation to resign then: 
 





Notice that the time of the obligation may diverge from the time of the action (the same applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to circumstantial possibility). For example, if uttered now, (4) says that 
Sandro now has the obligation to pick up Beth at the airport tomorrow: 
  
(4) Sandro must pick up Beth at the airport tomorrow. 
 
2.3 Implication as entailment 
At this point, it should be clear that MIC expresses the claim that proposition (P1) implies 
proposition (P2): 
 
(P1) that S has at time t the strong obligation to φ 
(P2) that it is circumstantially possible at time t for S to φ 
 
To be accurate, MIC says more than this, since it also specifies how to interpret ‘implies’. 
There are two main options in the literature:  
 
(i)  ‘implies’ is read pragmatically (Hare, 1963; Sinnott-Armstrong, 1984); 
(ii)  ‘implies’ is read semantically (Vranas, 2007).  
 
In (i), the idea is either that (P1) presupposes (P2), or that by expressing (P1), a speaker 
conversationally implicates (P2). We follow King (2017) in rejecting both pragmatic 
interpretations.1 King argues that it is not the case that (P1) presupposes (P2) because the latter 
 
1 As a matter of fact, King makes this point with respect to ‘ought’ and ‘can’, but the idea carries over 





proposition fails a crucial test for presuppositionality, namely, constancy under negation 
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990).2 As to the idea that ‘must’ conversationally implicates 
‘can’, the main problem raised by King is that the inference of (P2) from (P1) doesn’t have 
either of the two hallmarks of conversational implicatures, namely, cancelability and 
calculability (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Grice, 1989; Streumer, 2003).3 
This leaves the semantic interpretation of ‘implies’ as the only option, and that is why 
MIC is formulated in terms of entailment. Accordingly, the main idea behind MIC can also be 
expressed in this way: (P1) entails (P2). It follows that if MIC is true, discourse (5) expresses 
a logical contradiction, while conditional (6) a logical truth: 
  
(5) Nixon must resign, but he cannot. 





2 While it is clear that ‘Sandro stopped smoking’ and ‘Sandro didn’t stop smoking’ both imply ‘Sandro 
had been smoking’, it doesn’t seem right that ‘Elio must help the children’ and ‘It isn’t true that Elio 
must help the children’ both imply ‘Elio can help the children’—it seems perfectly consistent and 
felicitous to say ‘It isn’t true that Elio must help the children since he cannot do it anymore’. 
3 As for cancelability, consider the following dialogues (dialogue (ii) is adapted from King): 
 
(i) Speaker A: My car is broken. 
Speaker B: There is a garage around the corner.  
Speaker A: It is closed. 
 
(ii) Speaker C: You must save that drowning child. 
Speaker D: I can’t—the child is fifty miles away. 
 
In dialogue (i), what speaker B conversationally implicates by saying that there is a garage around the 
corner is that the garage is open. By denying this implicature, Speaker A does not deny that there is a 
garage around the corner. But when Speaker D in dialogue (ii) denies that she can help the drowning 





2.4 Looking ahead, or the shape of the argument 
But is MIC true? The remainder of this article is devoted to arguing that it is. Our argument 
has two components: first, we derive MIC from Kratzer’s semantic analysis of deontic ‘must’ 
and circumstantial ‘can’ (Section 3); second, we present novel empirical evidence showing that 
MIC predicts and explains the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers (Section 4). In 
this section, we briefly explain the logic behind this convergent argument. 
 Suppose that a well-confirmed theory (say, quantum mechanics) predicts phenomenon 
P. Regardless of whether you have tested P, quantum mechanics gives you a good reason to 
believe that P is the case. The first strand of our argument for MIC has the same structure. 
Kratzer’s semantics is a well-established theory of natural language modals—it is the default 
theory in linguistics (Portner, 2009). Kratzer’s analysis of deontic ‘must’ and circumstantial 
‘can’—we shall show—predicts MIC. Therefore, one has a good reason to believe that ‘must’ 
implies ‘can’. This is an understatement. Typically, when one says that a theory predicts a 
phenomenon, one means that the theory makes it probable that the phenomenon in question 
obtains. Our claim is stronger: Kratzer’s theory entails MIC. Indeed, we shall prove the latter 
from the former. Therefore, if Kratzer’s theory is true, MIC must be true. 
 By deriving MIC from Kratzer’s semantics, one gets a further explanatory benefit. As 
we saw above, linguistic analysis provides little reason to maintain that the relation between 
‘must’ and ‘can’ is pragmatic. The problem for the hypothesis that ‘must’ entails ‘can’ is that 
no account in line with a well-grounded semantics of modals has been proposed so far. By 
proving MIC from Kratzer’s analysis of ‘must’ and ‘can’ not only do we present one such 
account, but we also explain what grounds MIC: it is in virtue of the very meaning of deontic 





 But one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. MIC follows from Kratzer’s 
semantics? So much the worse for Kratzer, one might conclude if otherwise convinced that 
‘must’ doesn’t entail ‘can’. To address this worry, after presenting our derivation of MIC from 
Kratzer’s semantics, we report a series of acceptability judgment studies involving sentences 
that ascribe strong obligation in the face of circumstantial impossibility. We shall argue that 
MIC predicts and best explains the results of these empirical studies. Taken together, these two 
argumentative strands constitute very robust evidence in favour of MIC. 
 
3. MIC—Kratzer style 
Kratzer’s (2012) starting point is a traditional idea from modal logic: modals are quantifiers 
over possible worlds that are accessible from the world of evaluation; necessity modals (‘must’, 
‘have to’, etc.) are universal quantifiers, possibility modals (‘can’, ‘may’, etc.) are existential 
quantifiers. Therefore, a sentence like ‘Elio must φ’ is true if and only if Elio φs in all the 
accessible worlds, while a sentence like ‘Elio can φ’ is true if and only if Elio φs in some 
accessible worlds. Kratzer’s main innovation is to capture how different contexts can determine 
different accessibility relations even for the very same modal expression, thus giving rise to 
different modal flavours. 
In this section, we illustrate how this approach applies to deontic ‘must’ (Section 3.1) 
and circumstantial ‘can’ (Section 3.2). With this at hand, we develop Kratzer’s semantics in a 
direction that has been so far overlooked: we show that it is possible to derive MIC from it 
(Section 3.3). Our discussion of Kratzer’s semantics will make use of the Kaplanian view of 
truth in context (Kaplan, 1989), according to which a sentence S, uttered in a context c, is true 
in c if and only if the proposition S expresses in c is true in the world of c—we shall call this 





true in @’. However, we depart from Kaplan in that we adopt the by now standard referential 
analysis of tense (Abusch, 1997; King, 2007): tenses are variables that receive a value under 
the contextual assignment, hence there is no need to relativize the truth of propositions to times. 
Recall that, in the case of ‘must’ and ‘can’, their “tense value” is the time of the context. We 
shall use the symbol ‘tc’ to refer to this time. 
 
3.1 ‘Must’ 
Suppose that you come to know that Elio stole money from the orphanage, so you say to Mary:  
 
(7) Elio must go to jail. 
 
In this context—call it ‘c’—‘must’ clearly gets deontic flavour. One might suggest that it thus 
quantifies over all the worlds that conform to the normative standards holding in the world and 
at the time of c, and that your sentence says that in all such worlds Elio goes to jail. In other 
words, one might propose that (7) is true in c at the condition in (8):4 
 
(8) [[ Elio must go to jail ]]c, @ = 1  iff  for every w' such that w' conforms to the normative 
standards in @ at tc, Elio goes to jail in w'. 
 
But here is the catch: there is no possible world that conforms to plausible normative standards 
in which people steal money from the orphanage. Therefore, the analysis predicts that (7) is 
 
4 In this section, we proceed in a semi-formal fashion. See the Appendix for a fully-fledged 





true only if Elio goes to jail in worlds in which he didn’t steal any money—a clearly inadequate 
prediction. 
To fix this issue, Kratzer (2012) proposes that the meaning of ‘must’—in fact, the 
meaning of any modal—depends on two features of the context, which she calls conversational 
backgrounds. These jointly determine the set of worlds the modal quantifies over: 
 
i. a modal base function f, fixing a set f(w, t) of possible worlds that are accessible 
from a world w at a time t;5 
ii. an ordering source function g, ordering the worlds in f(w, t) according to how 
close they come to some normative ideal holding in w at t. 
 
In the case of deontic ‘must’, the idea goes like this. First, when applied to a world w 
and time t, the modal base function determines a set f(w, t) of worlds that are compatible with 
relevant circumstances obtaining in world w at time t. For your utterance of (7) in c, this is the 
set of worlds compatible with Elio’s circumstances in @ at tc—basically, the set of worlds in 
which Elio stole money from the orphanage. Second, the ordering source ranks the worlds in 
the set f(w, t) according to how close they come to the normative standards holding in w at t. 
As a result, ‘must’ ends up quantifying over the best among the worlds that are compatible with 
the relevant circumstances in w at t. Kratzer’s analysis hence assigns the following truth-
condition to (7) in c: 
 
5 In Kratzer’s analysis, the modal base function f doesn’t simply fix a set of worlds, but a set of 
propositions, i.e., a set of sets of worlds (see the Appendix). Given our aims, we can leave this 
complication aside. Moreover, the idea to specify the conversational backgrounds as functions from 
worlds and times, rather than just worlds, comes from an extension of Kratzer’s original framework to 
deal with the interaction between time and modality (Condoravdi, 2002). This world-time structure is 
now standard among formal semanticists. We adopt it to capture the fact that the times of the obligation 





(9) [[ Elio must go to jail ]]c, @ = 1  iff  for every w' in the set f(@, tc) (that is, w' is compatible 
with Elio’s circumstances in @ at tc), there is a w'' in f(@, tc) such that: (a) w'' is at least 
as good as w' in light of the normative ideal g(@, tc) (that is, the normative standards 
holding in @ at tc) and (b) Elio goes to jail in all the worlds in f(@, tc) that are at least 
as good as w'' in light of g(@, tc). 
 
This analysis solves the issue we encountered before: the truth of (7) in c is no longer 
predicted to require that Elio go to jail in worlds in which he didn’t steal any money, since such 
worlds are not in the set f(@, tc). Notice moreover that truth-condition (9) guarantees that (7) 
cannot be true vacuously. First, it is impossible that there is no world compatible with Elio’s 
circumstances—after all, @ is one such world. Second, the analysis requires that for (7) to be 
true, there be at least one best world among the worlds compatible with Elio’s circumstances 
in @ at tc such that Elio goes to jail in it—this follows from the existential quantification over 
w'' and the fact that the ordering relation ‘to be at least as good as’ is reflexive (hence w'' itself 
is a world in which Elio goes to jail). 
 
3.2 ‘Can’ 
Let’s now consider how Kratzer’s semantics deals with circumstantial possibility modals. 
Suppose that you and I have just finished designing a flyer. You ask me: “Who can print it?” 
And I respond: 
 






‘Can’ takes circumstantial flavour in this context. How can one express this flavour in terms 
of conversational backgrounds determining a set of accessible worlds? Exactly as in the case 
of deontic ‘must’, the modal base function determines a domain f(w, t) of worlds that are 
compatible with relevant circumstances obtaining in w at t—for my utterance of (10), a set of 
worlds compatible with Sandro’s circumstances in the world of the context @ at the time of 
the context tc. If, for example, Sandro doesn’t have enough money to print the flyer, the domain 
f(@, tc) will reflect this. 
What about the ordering source g(@, tc)? It clearly cannot be normative, since this is 
not a deontic use of ‘can’. As pointed out by Kratzer (1991), circumstantial ‘can’ has an empty 
ordering source, i.e., one which doesn’t restrict the domain selected by the modal base function 
f in any way. The reason is simple: it would be pointless in this case to rank the worlds in the 
domain selected by f in terms of some criterion or other. With respect to the truth or falsity of 
(10) in the reading in question, all those worlds are equally good: if Sandro is printing the flyer 
in any of them, then it is true that Sandro can print the flyer; otherwise, it is false. 
The truth-condition for (10) in the context above is thus as follows: 
 
(11) [[ Sandro can print the flyer ]]c, @ = 1 iff for some w' such that w' is in f(@, tc) (that is, 
w' is compatible with Sandro’s circumstances in @ at tc), Sandro prints the flyer in w'. 
 
Hence, my utterance of (10) is predicted to be true just in case Sandro prints the flyer in some 








3.3 Why ‘must’ implies ‘can’ 
In the previous two sections, we detailed the analyses of (deontic) ‘must’ and (circumstantial) 
‘can’ proposed by Kratzer. We now show that, from those analyses, MIC follows naturally. 
We proceed as follows: (i) we consider an arbitrary sentence ‘S must φ’ and a context c for it 
that assigns deontic flavour to ‘must’; (ii) we show that, given Kratzer’s analyses of deontic 
‘must’ and circumstantial ‘can’, the truth of ‘S can φ’ in c—where ‘can’ is assigned 
circumstantial flavour in c—follows from the truth of ‘S must φ’ in c. 
Suppose that Gina has got Alzheimer’s. Her only son, Elio, promises her that he will 
assist her until her last day. After Elio’s promise, Mary utters (12): 
 
(12) Elio must help his mother. 
  
‘Must’ expresses deontic necessity in the context of Mary’s utterance—call it ‘c’. Accordingly, 
(12) has truth-condition (13) in c: 
  
(13) [[ Elio must help his mother]]c, @ = 1 iff  for every w' in f(@, tc) (that is, w' is compatible 
with Elio’s circumstances in @ at tc), there is a w'' in f(@, tc) such that: (a) w'' is at least 
as good as w' in light of the normative ideal g(@, tc) (that is, the normative standards 
holding in @ at tc) and (b) Elio helps his mother in all the worlds in f(@, tc) that are at 
least as good as w'' in light of g(@, tc). 
 
Assume that (12) is indeed true in c. Given truth-condition (13), it follows that there is 
a world compatible with Elio’s circumstances in @ at tc in which Elio helps his mother—as we 





since at least @ is one such world, and (13) entails that there is a world w" in this set, at least 
as good as @, in which Elio helps his mother.6 But from this it follows that (14), on the reading 
in which ‘can’ is assigned circumstantial flavour, is also true in c: 
  
(14) Elio can help his mother. 
  
Here is why. On the reading in question, (14) receives truth-condition (15) in c: 
  
(15) [[ Elio can help his mother ]]c, @ = 1 iff  there is a world w' such that w' is in f(@, tc) and 
Elio helps his mother in w'. 
  
Hence, (14) is true in c if and only if Elio helps his mother in some world compatible with his 
circumstances in @ at tc. But, as we have just seen, the truth of (12) in c requires that there be 
a world compatible with Elio’s circumstances in @ at tc in which Elio helps his mother.  
We conclude that if (12) is true in c, (14) must also be true in c. Therefore, this section 
constitutes a proof of MIC from Kratzer’s semantics of deontic ‘must’ and circumstantial ‘can’. 
 
4. Going empirical 
The fact that MIC follows from Kratzer’s semantics of modals only gets one so far, since 
Kratzer’s theory might be wrong. This is why, in this section, we present the results of a series 
 
6 To be accurate, (13) entails that Elio helps his mother in all the worlds at least as good as w", but w" 





of acceptability judgment studies which—so we maintain—provide robust empirical evidence 
for MIC. Needless to say, these results also count as evidence for Kratzer’s theory.7 
 
4.1 Study 1: Present vs. past 
Suppose that a subject, S, contracts the strong obligation to φ, but it subsequently becomes 
circumstantially impossible for S to φ. Which of these two sentences would native English 
speakers consider to be the better description of S’s current situation?  
 
(i) S must φ, but S cannot φ. 
(ii) S was supposed to φ, but S cannot φ.  
 
MIC entails that (i) expresses a contradictory proposition in this context. In contrast, since there 
is nothing in MIC that prevents one to have a past obligation that cannot be fulfilled in the 
present, (ii) is not predicted to express a contradictory proposition in this context.  
On the natural assumption that competent speakers are typically reluctant to endorse 
contradictory propositions—call this ‘No contradiction’—MIC thus predicts that native 
English speakers will favour (ii) over (i) as the better description of S’s situation.8 Our first 
empirical study tested this prediction. To assess the robustness of this prediction, taking our 
cue from the literature on ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (Zimmerman, 1996), we investigated whether 
 
7 In this section, our focus is limited to a subset of the data. Beyond what is discussed below, we also 
collected open-ended qualitative data on participants’ explicit reasoning, as well as the time subjects 
took to answer the main probe. Since these additional data don’t affect the overall conclusion presented 
here, we have decided not to discuss them for reasons of space. Our complete design and datasets are 
available at: https://osf.io/uqe4x and https://osf.io/k2gce/. 
 
8 Here we read ‘endorse’ along the following lines: S endorses proposition p if and only if (1) S grasps 





sentence choice is influenced by type of impossibility (externally imposed vs. self-imposed) or 
by blame ascription. We accordingly included two conditions that differ in terms of how the 
impossibility occurs—due to an accident (externally imposed) or because of one’s decision 
(self-imposed)—and we also measured participants’ blame attribution.  
 
4.1.1 Method 
205 native English speakers (102 male, 102 female, 1 other, mean age = 38.11, SD = 12.17, 
range = 20-72) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk to fill in a short questionnaire.9 
Participants were assigned to either of two scenarios (The Stairs and The Hammer) in which a 
person promises to perform a certain action, which is subsequently rendered impossible. The 




A group of children is stuck deep in the mountains. It’s now too dark for an 
expedition to set off to rescue them today. If the children don’t get rescued by 
the end of the day tomorrow, they will die, so the expedition will leave at the 
earliest possible time tomorrow morning. 
 
Adam, the most skilled mountaineer in the area, promises to go on the 
expedition. However, while preparing for it, he accidentally falls down the 
stairs and breaks his legs, which renders him completely incapable of walking 
 
9 The original sample consisted of 338 participants. Of these, 116 were eliminated due to failed control 
questions and further 17 participants were eliminated due to failing the Impossibility probe (see below). 









A group of children is stuck deep in the mountains. It’s now too dark for an 
expedition to set off to rescue them today. If the children don’t get rescued by 
the end of the day tomorrow, they will die, so the expedition will leave at the 
earliest possible time tomorrow morning. 
 
Adam, the most skilled mountaineer in the area, promises to go on the 
expedition. However, while preparing for it, he realizes how dangerous the 
expedition will be. For this reason, he breaks his own legs, rendering himself 
completely incapable of walking for at least a month. Now it is impossible for 
Adam to go on the expedition tomorrow. 
 
Participants were then asked the following question: “Which one of the following two 
statements do you think better describes Adam’s current situation? 
(A) Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot. 
(B) Adam was supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot.”10 
Having chosen a sentence, participants were presented with the following question 
(Blame probe): “To what extent do you think Adam is to blame for failing to go on the 
expedition?” Responses were recorded on a 7-point scale (1: “No blame”, 4: “Moderate 
 
10 In the absence of a past tense form of ‘must’, ‘S was supposed to φ’ was chosen as past tense 
counterpart of ‘S must φ’ (to indicate that S’s obligation holds in the past). The quasi-modal 
construction ‘S had to φ’ wouldn’t have worked, since it has the implication that S did φ. We also 
wanted to avoid modal periphrases, e.g., ‘S had the obligation to φ’, since their syntactic structure 





blame”, 7: “Full blame”). This probe was followed by an Impossibility probe to determine 
whether participants agreed that the performance of the relevant action had become impossible 
for Adam after he broke his legs (“Do you agree that, after breaking his legs, it is impossible 
for Adam to go on the expedition?”). Participants who disagreed were not included in the 
analysis.11 
 
4.1.2 Results and discussion 
Out of 205 participants, 168 (82%) preferred the ‘was supposed to but cannot’ to the ‘must but 
cannot’ option (37; 18%). A binomial test shows this to be significantly different from a chance 
distribution, p < .01, 95% CI [0.76, 0.87]. As revealed by a chi-square test of independence, 
this general result was not significantly affected by scenario type (i.e., condition): 86 out of 
103 participants (83%) chose the ‘was supposed to but cannot’ variant in The Hammer 
condition, while 82 out of 102 (80%) did so in The Stairs condition; χ2(1, 205) = 0.33, p =.56, 
OR = 1.23, 95% CI [0.91, 1.18] (see Figure 1). 
 
11 Obviously, to test MIC one needs to look at the behaviour of subjects who consider the performance 
of the action impossible. Nevertheless, excluding the negative responses does not affect our results (this 







Figure 1. The distribution of sentence choices (‘was supposed to but cannot’ vs. ‘must but cannot’) per 
condition (The Stairs vs. The Hammer). The ordinate represents within-condition percentages. 
 
As indicated by an independent samples t-test, blame ascription to Adam was 
significantly higher in The Hammer condition (mean blame = 5.95; SD = 1.64; mode = 7) than 
in The Stairs condition (mean blame = 2.43; SD = 1.76; mode = 1), t(203) = 15.26, p < .01, 
mean difference = 3.52, 95% CI [3.05, 3.99], d = 2.05 (see Figure 2). To directly test whether 
blame influenced sentence choice, we conducted a logistic regression analysis, which included 
blame as well as age, gender, and response time as predictors of sentence choice. Unlike the 
null model (p < .01), the regression model was not significant, χ2(4) = 4.723, p = .32. In 








Figure 2. The distribution of blame scores as a function of condition. 
 
When presented with a scenario in which a subject (i.e., Adam) contracts the strong 
obligation to go on an expedition tomorrow but then the performance of the action becomes 
impossible, native English speakers judge sentence (B) ‘Adam was supposed to go on the 
expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’ to be a better description of the situation than sentence 
(A) ‘Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’ (82% vs. 18%).  In combination 
with No Contradiction, MIC explains and predicts these results. If MIC is the case, (A) 
expresses a contradictory proposition. In contrast, no contradiction obtains when the time of 
the obligation and the time of the impossibility differ, as they do in the proposition expressed 
by (B). Therefore, if competent speakers tend to avoid endorsing contradictory propositions, 
these results are expected. 
The results also indicate that the preference for ‘was supposed to but cannot’ over ‘must 
but cannot’ is completely uninfluenced by the source of the impossibility or blame: the fact 
that the impossibility is self-imposed or externally imposed doesn’t have any impact on 





having no information about blame attributions, having this information does not enable one 
to predict with improved accuracy what sentence participants will choose. This is exactly what 
MIC predicts: speakers should favour ‘was supposed to but cannot’ over ‘must but cannot’ 
regardless of the source of impossibility or what they think of Adam’s blameworthiness, 
because only the former sentence expresses a consistent proposition. 
 
4.2 Study 2: Strong vs weak obligations 
While ‘Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow’ ascribes to Adam a strong obligation in the 
present, ‘Adam was supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow’ ascribes to him a weak 
obligation in the past (Palmer, 1990). Therefore, the following question arises: isn’t it the case 
that, in Study 1, ‘Adam was supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’ is 
preferred over ‘Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’ just because Adam 
was never seen as being under a strong obligation to begin with? That is, couldn’t participants 
think that, in virtue of promising to go on the expedition, Adam is “only” supposed to go, rather 
than that he must go? If this were the case, one could explain their preference for ‘was supposed 
to but cannot’ over ‘must but cannot’ in Study 1 without invoking MIC. 
To adjudicate between these two interpretations of Study 1, in Study 2 we investigated 












We recruited 113 English native speakers (69 male, 44 female, mean age = 36.05, SD = 11.29, 
range = 20-76) via Amazon Mechanical Turk.12 They were presented with the following story:  
The Promise 
A group of children is stuck deep in the mountains. It’s now too dark for an 
expedition to set off to rescue them today. If the children don’t get rescued by 
the end of the day tomorrow, they will die, so the expedition will leave at the 
earliest possible time tomorrow morning. Adam, the most skilled mountaineer 
0in the area, promises to go on the expedition. 
 
The main probe was the same as in Study 1 (“Which one of the following two 
statements do you think better describes Adam’s current situation?”), but the options were as 
follows: 
 
(A’) Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow. 
(B’) Adam is supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow. 
 
4.2.2 Results and discussion 
Out of the 113 participants, 83 (73%) preferred the ‘must’ to the ‘is supposed to’ option (30; 
27%). A binomial test shows this distribution to be significantly different from chance, p < .01, 
95% CI [0.65, 0.81]. Furthermore, comparing the results of the current study with those of 
Study 1, a planned chi-square test of independence showed that the distribution of the 
 
12 The original sample consisted of 182 participants recruited with the same procedures as in Study 1 
(repeated participation was not allowed here or in any of our further studies). 69 of them were eliminated 





‘supposed to’ vs. ‘must’ variants was significantly affected by design type, χ2(1, 318) = 95.16, 
p < .01, OR = 12.56, 95% CI [7.26, 21.74]. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison between studies in terms of sentence choice (‘must’ vs. ‘is/was supposed to’). 
The ordinate represents within-study percentages. 
 
When presented with The Promise, native English speakers choose ‘Adam must go on 
the expedition tomorrow’ rather than ‘Adam is supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow’ 
(73% vs. 27%) as the best characterization of Adam’s situation after he promises to go on the 
expedition (when it is not impossible for him to fulfil the promise). Accordingly, this study 
indicates that Adam is seen as having a strong rather than a weak obligation. This rules out an 
interpretation of Study 1 according to which, after the impossibility is introduced, competent 
speakers prefer ‘was supposed to but cannot’ to ‘must but cannot’ because they think Adam 
never contracted a strong obligation in the first place.  
The combination of Study 1 and Study 2 offers strong evidence in favour of MIC (see 





description of Adam’s situation in Study 1: it ascribes to Adam a weak obligation in the past, 
while in fact participants think that Adam contracted a strong obligation. This makes Study 1 
a particularly stringent test for MIC, given that ‘must but cannot’ ascribes to Adam the right 
type of obligation and thus has a prima facie advantage over ‘was supposed to but cannot’. In 
Study 1, however, subjects preferred the latter option to the former. This means that they were 
willing to sacrifice the strength of the obligation, as long as this allowed them to locate the 
obligation in the past. MIC explains this: by locating the obligation in the past, participants can 
avoid endorsing a contradictory proposition. 
 
4.3 Study 3: Against the Blame Hypothesis 
In conjunction with No Contradiction, MIC makes two predictions. The first one was tested 
and confirmed in Study 1: when presented with a scenario in which a subject, S, contracts a 
strong obligation to φ which then becomes impossible to fulfil, native English speakers will 
typically favour sentence (ii) over sentence (i)—the sentences are repeated below.  
 
(i)  S must φ, but S cannot φ. 
(ii) S was supposed to φ, but S cannot φ.  
 
The second prediction is that competent speakers will generally find (i) unacceptable. 
This contrasts with what we may call the Blame Hypothesis, according to which competent 
speakers will tend to judge that an agent has the obligation to perform an impossible action 
when the agent is to blame for the impossibility—this latter hypothesis was formulated by 
Chituc et al. (2016) with respect to ‘ought’. The guiding motivation behind the Blame 





is pragmatic rather than semantic—more precisely, it is a conversational implicature and as 
such it can be cancelled (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, 1984 about ‘ought’ and ‘can’). One context in 
which it is cancelled—the Blame Hypothesis holds—is when the speaker wants to blame the 
agent. In such a context, speakers are thus expected to accept (i).  
Here is a slightly different, but related, way to conceive of the contrast between the 
Blame Hypothesis and MIC. According to the former, the acceptability of (i) is a continuous 
function of blame: the more a speaker finds an agent blameworthy, the greater the degree of 
acceptance of (i). In contrast, MIC has it that the relation between ‘must’ and ‘can’ is semantic, 
and it therefore predicts that there is no relation between degrees of blame and degrees of 
sentence acceptance: competent speakers will tend to reject (i) regardless of whether the agent 




We recruited 253 English native speakers (142 male, 110 female, 1 other, mean age = 38.56, 
SD = 11.28, range = 19-74) via Amazon Mechanical Turk.13 Save for one additional step, this 
study is identical to Study 1: participants were assigned to the same conditions (The Hammer 
vs. The Stairs) and were presented with the same question as before (i.e., they had to choose 
between ‘was supposed to but cannot’ and ‘must but cannot’). This time, however, participants 




13 The original sample consisted of 329 participants recruited using the same procedures as before, 56 
of whom were eliminated due to failed control questions. A further 20 participants were eliminated due 





“We would now like to know what you think of […] the statement with ‘must’: 
Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot. 
How good/bad is this statement as a description of Adam’s current situation?” 
 
The options ranged from “very bad” through “bad”, “good” and “very good” on a four-point 
scale (although the options were not numerically marked). The rest of the questionnaire was as 
in Study 1, including the Blame probe and the Impossibility probe. 
 
4.3.2 Results and discussion 
Out of 253 participants, 205 (81%) preferred ‘was supposed to but cannot’ to ‘must but cannot’ 
(48; 19%), replicating our previous results in relation to sentence choice, discussed in section 
4.1.2. Even though blame was significantly different between the two conditions (The Hammer: 
mean blame = 6.27; SD = 1.39; mode = 7; The Stairs: mean blame = 2.35; SD = 1.55; mode = 
1, t(251) = 21.05, p < .01, mean difference = 3.92, 95% CI [3.55, 4.28], d = 2.18), the result 
was once again not affected by scenario type: 101 out of 119 participants (85%) chose the ‘was 
supposed to but cannot’ variant in The Hammer condition, while 104 out of 134 (78%) did so 
in The Stairs condition; χ2(1, 253) = 2.16, p =.14, OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.85, 3.09]. 
Out of 253 participants, 176 (70%) thought that the ‘must’ sentence was a ‘bad’/’very 
bad’ description of Adam’s situation. A similar pattern emerged when we limited the analysis 
to those participants who selected the ‘was supposed to’ sentence: the majority of these 
participants (154 out of 205; 75%) thought that the ‘must’ sentence was ‘bad’ (126; 61%) or 
‘very bad’ (27; 14%). As to the small minority of our sample who chose ‘must but cannot’, 22 





Crucially, we found no evidence that sentence evaluation was influenced by condition: 
by dichotomising all the responses to the Graded follow-up probe into ‘GOOD’ (‘very good’ 
+ ‘good’) vs. ‘BAD’ (‘bad’ + ‘very bad’) evaluations, we found that ‘must but cannot’ was 
judged as BAD by 86 of the 119 (72%) participants in The Hammer condition, and by 90 of 
the 134 (67%) participants in The Stairs condition, χ2(1, 253) = .776, p =.38, OR = 1.27, 95% 
CI [0.74, 2.19] (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. The distribution of sentence evaluations (BAD vs. GOOD) per condition (The Stairs vs. The 
Hammer). The ordinate represents within-condition percentages. 
 
To directly test influence of blame attributions on sentence evaluation, we performed 
two types of analysis. In the first, we used the dichotomised scores for the Graded follow-up 
probe. We ran a logistic regression including blame, age, gender, and response time as 
predictor variables. Unlike the null model (p < .01), the regression model was not significant, 
χ2(4) = 5.137, p = .27. In particular, blame was not a significant predictor of sentence 





‘GOOD’ vs. ‘BAD’ evaluations was not significantly different when comparing subjects with 
high blame rating (i.e., levels of blame in the range of 5-7) to subjects with non-high blame 
rating (i.e., levels of blame in the range of 1-4): ‘must but cannot’ was judged BAD by 94 out 
of 130 (72%) of the “non-high blamers” and by 82 out of 123 (67%) of the “high blamers”, 
χ2(1, 253) = .95, p =.33, OR = 1.31, 95% CI [0.76, 2.23]. In the second analysis, we correlated 
the raw responses to the Blame probe with the raw responses to the Graded follow-up probe, 
and we found that the correlation was not significant, r(271) = .03, p = .61.14 
When they were presented with a scenario in which a subject (i.e., Adam) contracts a 
strong obligation to perform an action which subsequently becomes impossible, competent 
speakers tended to judge the sentence ‘Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he 
cannot’ as a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ description of Adam’s situation (70%). The fact that competent 
speakers generally found ‘must but cannot’ unacceptable is exactly what one should expect 
given MIC in combination with No Contradiction. Unsurprisingly, this pattern of judgment 
was also found when limiting the analysis to those subjects who chose ‘was supposed to but 
cannot’ in the initial probe (75% of these subjects found ‘must but cannot’ to be ‘bad’/‘very 
bad’). One can thus take subjects’ preference for ‘was supposed to but cannot’ as a reliable 
indicator of their rejection of ‘must but cannot’, hence further corroborating the results of Study 
1.  
MIC states that ‘must’ entails ‘can’, thus it predicts that rejection of ‘must but cannot’ 
shouldn’t vary depending upon blame ascription: competent speakers should rather reject this 
sentence across the board. In contrast, the Blame Hypothesis has it that sentence acceptance is 
a function of blame, and that subjects will tend to accept ‘Adam must go on the expedition, but 
 
14 One might think that a non-parametric analysis is better suited to our type of data. For this reason, we 






he cannot’ when they blame Adam for the impossibility. Our results clearly favour MIC over 
the Blame Hypothesis: 
 
• Even though blame ascription was significantly higher in The Hammer (mean = 6.27; 
mode = 7) than in The Stairs (mean = 2.35; mode = 1), there was no significant 
difference between the two conditions in terms of how subjects evaluated the 
acceptability of ‘must but cannot’. 
• Even though blame ascription was almost ceiling in The Hammer, 72% of the subjects 
in this condition—including those who chose the ‘must’ sentence to begin with—
judged ‘Adam must go on the expedition, but he cannot’ as ‘bad’/‘very bad’.  
• Blame was not a reliable predictor of sentence acceptance: compared to having no 
information about blame attribution, having this information does not enable one to 
predict with improved accuracy whether a subject will judge ‘must but cannot’ as good 
or bad. 
• The majority of subjects that ascribed high blame to Adam found ‘Adam must go on 
the expedition, but he cannot’ to be bad (67%)—a result not significantly different from 
that of “non-high blamers” making the same judgment (72%).  
• The degree to which speakers found the agent blameworthy didn’t correlate with the 
degree to which they accepted ‘Adam must go on the expedition, but he cannot’.  
 
Combined together, these results provide robust support for MIC over the Blame Hypothesis, 
in that they indicate that competent speakers tend to reject ‘S must but S cannot’ regardless of 






4.4 Study 4: Explaining contradictions away 
In this final study, we considered a possible objection concerning the validity of our previous 
results. All our studies so far involved an explicit comparison between a sentence with ‘must’ 
and an alternative sentence featuring ‘supposed’. However, sentence production/evaluation in 
real life doesn’t usually involve such comparisons. One might thus raise the worry that when 
presented with sentence (A) ‘Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’ with 
no competing alternatives, competent speakers might be inclined to accept it as a correct 
description after all. If this turned out to be the case, it would raise a difficulty for MIC, since 
sentence (A) expresses a proposition which is a contradiction on MIC, i.e., proposition (P-A): 
 
(P-A) that Adam has at time t the strong obligation to go on the expedition tomorrow, but it is 
circumstantially impossible at time t for Adam to go on the expedition tomorrow 
 
In Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that if people accept sentence (A) when presented 
with it with no competing alternatives, they do so not because they are endorsing and trying to 
communicate the literal meaning of (A), but instead because they are reading (A) as conveying 
the related but distinct proposition (P-B)—where t-1 is a time in the past of t: 
 
(P-B) that Adam has at time t-1 the obligation to go on the expedition tomorrow, but it is 
circumstantially impossible at time t for Adam to go on the expedition tomorrow 
 
In other words, our hypothesis is that if speakers indeed accept sentence (A), they do so to 
ascribe a past obligation that cannot be fulfilled anymore, rather than a present, unfulfillable 





would not constitute a problem for MIC, since MIC is clearly consistent with someone having 
a past obligation which cannot be fulfilled in the present.  
 
4.4.1 Method 
We recruited 211 English native speakers (125 male, 85 female, 1 other, mean age = 38.82 SD 
= 12.69, range = 19-76) via Amazon Mechanical Turk.15 Participants were presented with the 
same scenarios as in Studies 1 and 3 (i.e., The Stairs and The Hammer). However, unlike in 
Studies 1 and 3, they went through the following two-stage process. First, they were asked the 
following Yes-No question (Must probe): “Do you agree that the following statement correctly 
describes Adam’s current situation? (Yes/No) 
(A) Adam must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot.” 
Second, in the case of a positive answer in response to the Must probe, subjects were 
asked to express what they had in mind, by choosing between a ‘has to but cannot’ and a ‘was 
supposed to but cannot’ sentence variant (Clarification probe): “You agreed that Adam must 
go on the expedition tomorrow, even though he cannot. If you had to express what you had in 
mind in different words, which one of the following statements would you choose? 
 
(A’’) Adam has to go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot. 





15 We used the same procedures as in Studies 1 and 3. The original sample consisted of 344 participants. 
Of these, 115 were eliminated due to failed control questions, and further 18 participants were 





4.4.2 Results and discussion 
Of the 211 participants, 190 (90%) responded with “Yes” and 21 (10%) with “No” to the Must 
probe. We found no evidence that response to the Must probe was influenced by condition: 97 
of the 106 (92%) participants in The Hammer condition, and 93 of the 105 (89%) participants 
in The Stairs condition agreed with the ‘must but cannot’ sentence, χ2(1, 211) = .508, p =.48, 
OR = 1.39, 95% CI [0.56, 3.45]. 
We conducted a logistic regression analysis, which included blame, age, gender, and 
response time as predictors, and response to the Must probe as the outcome variable. Unlike 
the null model (p < .01), the regression model was not significant, χ2(4) = 3.862, p =.43. In 
particular, blame was not a significant predictor of participants’ response to the Must probe, p 
= .93, OR = 1.01, 95% CI [0.84, 1.21]). 
Of the 190 participants answering “Yes”, 160 (84%) chose the ‘was supposed to but 
cannot’ sentence and 30 (16%) chose the ‘has to but cannot’ sentence in response to the 
Clarification probe (Figure 5). Again, we found no evidence that this distribution was 
influenced by condition: 82 of the 97 (85%) participants in The Hammer condition, and 78 of 
the 93 (84%) participants in The Stairs condition chose the ‘was supposed to but cannot’ 
sentence, χ2(1, 190) = .016, p =.9, OR = 1.05, 95% CI [0.48, 2.29]. We conducted a second 
logistic regression analysis, including the same predictor variables as before, and response to 
the Clarification probe as the outcome variable. Unlike the null model (p < .01), the regression 
model was not significant, χ2(4) = 9.115, p =.06. In particular, blame was not a significant 








Figure 5. The distribution of responses. To the right of the dashed line are those who responded with 
“No”, whilst to the left are those who responded with “Yes” to the Must probe. The latter subgroup is 
further divided according to participants’ response to the Clarification probe (‘was supposed to but 
cannot’ vs. ‘has to but cannot’). 
 
In the present study, speakers overwhelmingly accepted (90%) sentence (A) (‘Adam 
must go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’) as a correct description of Adam’s 
situation (The Stairs: 89%, The Hammer: 92%). This appears to be in striking contrast with the 
results of the previous studies. More importantly, the present result also appears to count as 
evidence against MIC, since the proposition expressed by (A), namely (P-A) (repeated below), 
is predicted to be a contradiction by MIC. 
 
(P-A) that Adam has at time t the strong obligation to go on the expedition tomorrow, but it 
is circumstantially impossible at time t for Adam to go on the expedition tomorrow 
 
There is, however, a crucial difference between Studies 1 and 3 and the present study: 





whereas in the present study (A) was the only sentence participants were given in the first part 
of the task. The following alternative hypothesis thus arises: participants in the present study 
accept (A) not because they endorse its literal meaning, i.e., proposition (P-A), but rather 
because they endorse, and are trying to communicate, a closely related but distinct proposition, 
namely (P-B) (repeated below), which doesn’t find adequate linguistic formulation in the task 
at hand. 
 
(P-B) that Adam has at time t-1 the obligation to go on the expedition tomorrow, but it is 
circumstantially impossible at time t for Adam to go on the expedition tomorrow 
 
The results of our study confirm this alternative hypothesis. Given the near synonymy 
of ‘must’ and ‘have to’ as present tense strong necessity modals, we can safely assume that 
(A’’) (‘Adam has to go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’) expresses proposition (P-
A), while (B) (‘Adam was supposed to go on the expedition tomorrow, but he cannot’) 
expresses proposition (P-B). When asked what they had in mind when they accepted (A) as a 
correct description of Adam’s situation, speakers overwhelmingly favoured (B) over (A’’) 
(84% vs. 16%), thus indicating that when they accepted (A) they were not endorsing (P-A), but 
rather (P-B).  
Not only is this consistent with MIC; it is predicted and explained by it: when accepting 
sentence (A), speakers don’t endorse the proposition literally expressed by (A), given that this 
proposition is a contradiction; rather, they accept (A) as a means to communicate a closely 
related but non-contradictory proposition. Yet again, this phenomenon obtains irrespective of 





The apparent tension between the results obtained in Studies 1 and 3, on the one hand, 
and Study 4, on the other, suggests an important methodological consideration regarding the 
experimental study of modals in natural language. Given the massive polysemy of modal 
expressions, experimental participants might assign different interpretations to a modal even 
when experimenters carefully control for the contextual variables relevant for interpreting the 
modal. Our results indicate that this is particularly prone to happen when a modal sentence is 
presented with no competing alternative, since this gives participants more room for 
interpretation. This effect can be mitigated by presenting participants with two or more modal 
sentences, since participants can use the contrast to focus on the relevant modal interpretation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The relation among different modal flavours is an understudied area of natural language 
semantics. In this article, we have contributed to this area by examining the question whether 
deontic ‘must’ entails circumstantial ‘can’. We have given a convergent argument in support 
of a positive answer.  
First, we have proven that MIC follows from a well-established theory of modality in 
natural language—Kratzer’s semantics. Kratzer’s analysis of deontic ‘must’ has it that the truth 
of ‘S must φ’ in a context c (assigning deontic flavour to ‘must’) entails that S φ-es in some of 
the worlds compatible with S’s circumstances in @ at tc. But this is sufficient for ‘S can φ’, 
read circumstantially, to be true in c. Therefore, in a context c that assigns deontic flavour to 
‘must’ and circumstantial flavour to ‘can’, the proposition expressed by ‘S must φ’ entails the 
proposition expressed by ‘S can φ’. 
Second, we have tested MIC against the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers. 





becomes then impossible for S to fulfil, not only do competent speakers favour the linguistic 
ascription of a past obligation (‘S was supposed to φ, but S cannot φ’) over the ascription of a 
present obligation (‘S must φ, but S cannot φ’), but they also evaluate the latter sentence as bad 
or very bad, and they do so regardless of whether they find S blameworthy for the impossibility 
in question. This is of course what one should expect given MIC plus the natural assumption 
that competent speakers are not willing to endorse contradictory propositions. In fact, our data 
show that even when they do accept sentences such as ‘S must φ, but S cannot φ’, speakers do 
so not because they endorse the contradictory proposition that S has at time t the strong 
obligation to φ, but it is circumstantially impossible at time t for S to φ, but rather because they 
endorse the MIC-consistent proposition that S has at time t-1 the obligation to φ, but it is 
circumstantially impossible at time t for S to φ. 
 By putting together this theoretical and empirical evidence, one has excellent reasons 
















APPENDIX: Formal derivation of MIC 
This appendix provides a proof of MIC from Kratzerian semantic clauses for the modal 
operators of necessity and possibility, given a context in which necessity is deontic and 
possibility is circumstantial. The proof is casted in a formal system combining Kratzer’s 
semantics for modals (Kratzer 2012) with a Kaplanian framework for utterance-truth (Kaplan, 
1989). With respect to the main text, the following presentation follows Kratzer more closely 
in defining conversational backgrounds as functions whose values are sets of propositions 
(premise sets). 
 
The propositional modal language L: 
L is a triple <P, Conn, Op> where: 
● P = {p0, p1, p2, ...} is an infinite set of propositional atoms. 
● Conn = {¬, →} is the set of propositional connectives. 
● Op = {Nec, Pos} is the set of modal operators. 
 
Well-formed formulas (wffs) of L are defined as follows: 
● Propositional atoms are wffs 
● If A, B are wffs, then ¬A, A→B, Nec(A), Poss(A) are wffs. 
● Nothing else is a wff. 
 
The model M for L: 
M is a quadruple <W, T, C, [[ . ]]> where: 
1. W = {w0, w1, w2, ...} is the set of possible worlds. 





3. C = {c0, c1, c2, ...} is the set of contexts; each context c specifies a modal base function 
fc and an ordering source function gc, besides a time tc and a world wc; the functions fc 
and gc map world-time pairs <w, t> ∈ W × T to (possibly empty) sets of propositions X 
⊆ ℘(W). 
4. [[ . ]] is a function mapping a well-formed formula φ of L, relative to a context 
parameter ci ∈ C, onto a proposition p ∈ ℘(W). 
 
For deontic necessity modals and circumstantial possibility modals, fc(w, t) is a set of 
propositions representing the relevant circumstances in w at t.  For deontic necessity modals, 
gc(w, t) is a set of “ideal” propositions entertained in w at t. For circumstantial possibility 
modals, gc(w, t) = ∅. 
The ordering ≤gc(w, t) is defined as the following reflexive and transitive relation: 
 
5. w'' ≤gc(w, t) w'  iff  {p ∈ gc(w, t): p(w') = 1} ⊆ {p ∈ gc(w, t): p(w'') = 1} 
 
The semantics of L is defined by clauses 6-10 (the modal operators in 9 and 10 correspond to 
Kratzer’s technical notions of necessity and possibility, respectively): 
 
6. [[ pn ]]c ⊆ W 
7. [[ ¬A ]]c = [[ A ]]c  
8. [[ A → B ]]c = [[ A ]]c ∪ [[ B ]]c 
9. [[ Nec(A) ]]c = {w ∈ W: for all w' in ∩fc(w, tc) there is a w" in ∩fc(w, tc) such that w'' 





10.  [[ Poss(A) ]]c = {w ∈ W: for some w' in ∩fc(w, tc), for all w" in ∩fc(w, tc) such that w'' 
≤gc(w, tc) w' there is a w''' in ∩fc(w, tc) such that w''' ≤gc(w, tc) w'' and A(w''') = 1} 
 
When [[ Poss(A) ]]c is a purely circumstantial possibility, gc(w, tc) = ∅ and clause 10 reduces 
to 10* (since  ≤gc(w, tc) holds between any two worlds in ∩fc(w, tc)): 
 
10*.  [[ Poss(A) ]]c = {w ∈ W: for some w' in ∩fc(w, tc), A(w') = 1} 
 
A relation of entailment ⊨ between a set of propositions X ⊆ ℘(W) and a proposition p ∈ ℘(W) 
is defined as follows: 
 
11. X ⊨ p   iff   p is true in all worlds in which all the propositions in X are true 
 
Derivation of MIC 
We prove the following claim: 
 
(MIC) For any context c such that fc is a circumstantial modal base (underlying the 
interpretation of Nec and Poss) and gc is a deontic ordering source (underlying the 
interpretation of Nec only), the following entailment holds: 
[[ Nec(A) ]]c   ⊨   [[ Poss(A) ]]c 
 
Let’s assume that c is a context as specified in (MIC) and the proposition [[ Nec(A) ]]c  is true 






(A) for all w' in ∩fc(@, tc) there is a w" in ∩fc(@, tc) such that w" ≤gc(@, tc) w' and for all w''' 
in ∩fc(@, tc) such that w''' ≤gc(@, tc) w", A(w''') = 1 
  
The following holds for the modal base fc(@, tc)—since @ itself is certainly a world in which 
the circumstances picked up by  fc in <@,  tc> hold: 
 
(B)  there is at least a w' in ∩fc(@, tc) 
 
Let w1 be such a world w' as in (B). Then, it follows from (A) that 
 
(C) there is a w" in ∩fc(@, tc) such that w" ≤gc(@, tc) w1 and for all w''' in ∩fc(@, tc) such that 
w''' ≤gc(@, tc) w", A(w''') = 1 
 
Let w2 be such a world w'' as in (C). Then, it follows from (C) that 
 
(D) for all w''' in ∩fc(@, tc) such that w''' ≤gc(@, tc) w2, A(w''') = 1 
 
By reflexivity of the ordering ≤gc(@, tc), it follows from (D) that 
 
(E) A(w2) = 1 
 
Given the way w2 has been introduced, it follows from (E) that 
 






At this point, it is enough to observe that (F) gives just the truth condition guaranteeing that  
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